Malak Sheth 4th September, 2023 ➣Introduction
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the landmark case between Workmen Of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management Of Dimakuchi Tea Estate ( “the case”) resolved the controversy around the scope of the expression “of any person” occurring in the third part of the definition clause of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act (“ the Act”). The Hon’ble Court had to determine if the dispute or difference of any person, regarding their employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour, falls within the scope of Section 2(k) to raise an industrial dispute. It was contended by the petitioners that the expression “of any person is an expression of very wide import and there are no reasons why the words “any person” should be equated with “any workman”, as the tribunals below had done. However, the Hon’ble Court rejected this argument to hold that ‘any person’ cannot be equated to anyone and everyone in the whole wide world and the same must be restricted to persons whom the workmen share a community of interest with.
The judgement of the Hon’ble Court in the case was based upon certain presuppositions regarding the legislative intent behind Section 2 (k) of the Act. However, it needs reconsideration in light of the promulgation of the Industrial Relations Code 2020 and the instances where the Courts have interpreted the expression “community of interest” broadly to find the same between workmen and non-workmen as well. Thus, the author through this piece argues, firstly that this judgement needs reconsideration in light of the Industrial Relations Code 2020 ( “the Code”); and secondly, that the majority judgement was flawed in determining the object and scheme of the Act and when the same is construed correctly, “any person” in Section 2(k) cannot be equated with “any workman”.
➣Background of the case
Dr. K.P. Banerjee was appointed Assistant Medical Officer of the Dimakuchi tea estate on November 1, 1950. Later, the next year, he received a letter from his manager stating that his services had been terminated. Dr Banerjee was a part of the local trade union, Assam Karmachari Sangha, which decided to support his cause and thus conciliation proceedings were initiated under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“the Act”). However, the same was unsuccessful and the appropriate government referred the case to the tribunal constituted under Section 7 of the Act. The Tribunal held that because Dr Banerjee was not a “workman,” his case could not be termed as an “industrial dispute” under the Act and refused to grant him any relief. Finally, the case reached the Supreme Court of India (“the case“) which held that “any person” as it appears in Section 2(k) of the Act cannot have its widest amplitude and thus must be restricted to “any workman”.
➣ Case Analysis- A need for reconsideration
The petitioners in the case had argued that the legislature must have something in mind when instead of using the expression ‘any workman’, it used the much wider expression ‘any person’ in Section 2(k) of the Act. Thus, while deliberating upon such a reason, the majority felt that the ‘any person’ in Section 2 (k) was to accommodate ‘dismissed workman’ as they were not included within the definition of ‘workman’ under Section 2 (j) prior to the 1956 amendment. Now, when this case was decided in 1958, the judges had a reason to assume that the expression “any person” was used to fill the vacuum arising from the pre-amended definition of workmen.
However, in light of the new Industrial Relations Code 2020, wherein the legislature retained the expression ‘any person’, instead of using the much narrower ‘any workman’ as was held to be its scope in the case, under Section 2(q) of the IRC Code, the assumption made in the case should no longer hold ground. Also, if the legislature so wanted, it could have amended the definition in the multiple amendments it made to the Act, the latest one being in 2010. Therefore, when the legislature re-promulgated the section without any changes that adopted the judicial interpretation, it should be construed to have denied the judicial interpretation. Thus, the question that the re-enactment of the section raises is if a trade union can now raise an industrial dispute regarding the employment of any person after the Industrial Relations Code is notified. The same is not currently allowed in light of the judgement of the Court in the case where it equated “any person” in Section 2(k) with “any workman”.
This brings us to the second contention which is to correctly decide on the issue of the object and scheme of the Act as this is what the judges in the majority and minority disagreed upon. The judge in the minority recognised the object and scheme of the Act to preserve industrial peace and harmony and the majority recognised it as one that protects the best interest of the workmen. However, the Act was introduced with the aim to minimize disputes to maximise productivity and thus when this aim is analysed in the backdrop of the factual matrix of the case, the opinion of the minority garners greater support. This is because in the present case, were the demands of the workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate not been accepted by the management, they could have resorted to strike for the fulfilment of their demands which would have affected the Industry’s productivity. This would mean that the object of the Act would have been defeated. Thus, the author argues for allowing the workmen to raise an industrial dispute for ‘any person’ which would then trigger the mechanisms for resolution under the Act and ensure that the productivity of the industry is not hampered.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case introduced the concepts of ‘direct’ and ‘substantial’ interest of the workmen in the dispute and a ‘community of interest’ with the person for whom the dispute is being raised. However, such preconditions in raising an industrial dispute for ‘any person’ have caused a lot of confusion as to what constitutes such an interest, as was rightly predicted in the minority opinion by Justice Sarkar. The ambiguity surrounding such an interest led future judgements to proclaim that it is a mixed question of fact and law that needs to be decided on a case-to-case basis which led to more inefficiencies in the industry till the dispute was decided by the court.
Further, there also has been a lack of consistency in the decisions of the courts as the expression “community of interest” has been interpreted differently in different cases. In fact, inMukund Ltd v. Mukand Staff and Officers a ‘community of interest’ was found between workmen and non-workmen as well which is paradoxical to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case which sought to equate “any person” to “any workman”. Thus, in finding such a ‘community of interest” between workmen and non-workmen, the court raised the question of the necessity of entangling the issue with ambiguous concepts of ‘direct’ and ‘substantial’ interest and ‘community of interest’.
Furthermore, in another case, Standard Vacuum Refining Company of India v. Workmen, an industrial dispute was allowed to be raised by the workmen for regularizing the job of the contract labourers, by finding a ‘community of interest’ between the workmen and the bonded labourers. Thus, the author, through the present piece, argues for the need to do away with the ambiguity shuddered in by these preconditions to raise an industrial dispute for ‘any person”. This would allow an industrial dispute regarding ‘any person’ with the capability of affecting industrial peace, harmony and productivity to be referred for effective resolution under the Act without having to fulfil any stringent set of conditions.
➣ Conclusion
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Dimakuchi Tea Estate case, which held that disputes or differences must be connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any workman, needs fresh reconsideration after the promulgation of the new Industrial Relations Code, 2020. The same was argued because the legislature must be presumed to have taken into consideration the judicial interpretation while framing new statutes. Thus, by re-promulgating the enactment without adopting such an interpretation, its intentions are made clear to reject the same.
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